For over 200 years, the law in New York has been that the owner of a domestic animal who either knows or should have known of that animal’s vicious propensities will be held strictly liable for the harm the animal causes as a result of those propensities (see, Collier v. Zambito, 1 NY3d 444 [2004], Hosmer v Carney, 228 NY 73 [1920]; Vrooman v Lawyer, 13 Johns 339 [1816]; see also Restatement [Second] of Torts § 509).
To avail oneself of this strict liability theory, however, a plaintiff needed to demonstrate that a pet owner knew or should have known about their darling’s violent propensities. This is commonly referred to as the “one-bite” rule in recognition of the truth that, all things being equal, the first time a dog sunk teeth into human flesh was a free hit. Thereafter, however, with a vicious propensity thusly established, strict liability would attach to subsequent acts of canine carnivory.
New York’s adherence to this rule engendered the corollary rule that victims of domestic animal attacks could not bring common-law negligence claims against the pet’s owners (see, Bard v. Jahnke, 6 NY3d 592, 599 [2006]). In Bard, the Court of Appeals expressly declined to “dilute our traditional rule [of strict liability] under the guise of a companion common-law cause of action” (Bard v. Jahnke, 6 NY3d 592, 599, supra ). The Court stated in no uncertain terms that “when harm is caused by a domestic animal, its owner’s liability is determined solely by application of the rule articulated in Collier [emphasis supplied]” (Bard, supra at 599).
After Bard was decided in 2006, the Court of Appeals consistently reaffirmed that no cause of action for ordinary negligence lies for injuries caused by a household pet (see, Doerr v. Goldsmith, 25 NY3d 1114 [2015]; Smith v. Reilly, 17 NY3d 895 [2011]; Petrone v. Fernandez, 12 NY3d 546 [2009]; Bernstein v. Penny Whistle Toys, Inc., 10 NY3d 787 [2008]). This steadfast adherence to the “one-bite” rule “made New York an outlier” in comparison with states from across the country (see, Flanders v. Goodfellow, __ NY3d __ [April 17, 2025], at p. 6).
However, in April, the Court of Appeals decided Flanders v. Goodfellow, expressly overruling Bard and declaring that New York would henceforth follow “a two-pronged approach to liability for harms caused by animals” (Flanders, __ NY3d __ [April 17, 2025], at p. 8). Specifically, Associate Judge Caitlin J. Halligan, writing for a unanimous Court, instructed:
A plaintiff who suffers an animal-induced injury therefore has a choice. If the owner knew or should have known the animal had vicious propensities, the plaintiff may seek to hold them strictly liable. Or they can rely on rules of ordinary negligence and seek to prove that the defendant failed to exercise due care under the circumstances that caused their injury. Of course, a plaintiff might also assert both theories of liability * * *.
With Flanders, New York has now joined the rest of the country in permitting recovery not only under strict liability theory, but also under the rules of ordinary negligence. However, contrary to some initial fears that a Pandora’s Box was being opened, the sky is not falling.
That is, while Flanders certainly expands pet-owner liability by recognizing a broad theory of recovery where none previously existed, imposing a duty to act with due care in this context fully harmonizes with the canonical underpinnings of tort law in this State. Indeed, invoking Palsgraf and subsequent precedents, the Court in Flanders recognized that “[a] single idea unites these decisions: when people go about their daily lives, the law generally requires them to take reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm” (Flanders v. Goodfellow, __ NY3d __ [April 17, 2025], at p. 6).
Viewed through this lens, we see that the upshot of Flanders is simply that liability for animal-induced injury will be analyzed as would any other injury-producing act/omission – and why not? The excuse that “dogs will be dogs” is trite and, need I say it, humans should know better. Surely, the “one-bite” rule has had no appreciable societal benefits for New York, so why perpetuate this antediluvian incongruity?
Of course, only time will tell exactly how Flanders will impact the lives of New Yorkers (if at all). While it is undoubtedly a generational win for the plaintiff’s bar, pet owners (and their insurers) should not expect apocalyptic consequences to result. The overwhelming majority of states have long-since permitted ordinary negligence claims in this context, and they all seem to be getting along just fine.